Introduction:
Incentives ranging from tax abatements to grants have become a ubiquitous tool of economic development for cities and states 1 . These programs target firms for special treatment by governments to induce companies to relocate, expand existing operation, or preempt an existing company from moving elsewhere. Politicians' enthusiasm for these programs isn't being driven by academic studies highlighting their effectiveness. Numerous studies find that these incentive programs have limited impact on investment decisions and that the programs' price tag often exceeds their benefits.
While there is a growing consensus on the potential problems with these programs, there is considerable heterogeneity in the literature across programs that has led to numerous studies of individual incentive programs. In this paper, I add to this debate by analyzing two flagship state incentive programs, one from Virginia and one from Maryland. I then estimate how these programs impact job creation.
I make two advances from previous studies. First, I use the same methods and data sources to generate two comparable estimates of the job creation impacts of these different state programs during the same estimation window (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . For both studies, I compare the job creation performance of incentivized firms with a control group of firms using the same variables for matching. This provides a clear comparison of these programs in terms of their effectiveness in targeting firms.
Second, my analysis, to my knowledge, is the first "pre-registered" study of the impact of investment incentives. 2 My data collection methods, coding decisions, and estimation strategy were all pre-specified prior to data collection. My pre-registration document (archived prior to receiving 1 Klein and Moretti (2013) .
2 the data) identifies my research design of matching incentivized firms to non-incentivized firms using coarsened exact matching (CEM) to compare firms receiving incentives with a control group of firms. My pre-registration document provided full details on my estimation strategy and mock tables that were left blank. These tables, complete now with estimates of the impact of incentives on job creation, are central to this paper (Table 2 and Table 3 ).
My findings cast considerable doubt on the effectiveness of these programs. For both the Maryland and Virginia programs, incentivized firms have no greater proclivity to generate jobs than comparable firms that did not receive incentives. Not only are the estimates statistically indistinguishable from zero, the substantive sizes of the estimates are small. The most generous estimate of the impact of incentives on jobs is equivalent to two jobs per incentive (relative to an average incentive of over $400,000).
To assure compliance with incentive agreements, both Virginia and Maryland monitor performance (including job creation) and have the ability to cancel incentive agreements and claw back incentive rewards. Even when I purge these worst performing companies from the data set, I
still find no impact of incentives on job creation.
My findings provide further criticisms of incentive programs using a pre-registered research design. In the conclusion, I describe how pre-registration can be used for internal evaluations or government oversight of incentive programs. Incentive programs can provide clear details on their evaluation methods that are agreed upon by all parties. This provides an additional benefit of limiting the politicization of these programs.
Theory and Context
Economic development incentives have become one of the most common tools utilized by US states and municipalities to help generate jobs, costing an excess of $50 billion a year (Thomas 2000) . Jensen (2016) Also important for this discussion are the costs of job creation from these incentive programs relative to other alternatives. For example, Hanson and Rohlin (2011) find that enterprise zones are associated with job creation, but due to the small impact and job losses in other firms this amounts to a cost per job of $2.9 million. A more modest estimate can be derived from simulations from Funderberg et al (2013, 557) , in which they conclude:
When we isolate the value of industrial incentives from the basic tax system in our theoretically preferred marginal tax measure, we find that a 10 percent reduction in liability achieved by way of lowering taxes is associated with a 4.5 percent increase in value added while an equivalent reduction achieved by way of increasing incentives is associated with only 1.2 percent industrial growth, the latter elasticity not statistically different from zero. These studies provided limited comparisons across programs. In this paper, I examine two separate incentive programs, estimating the impact of the programs on job creation in Virginia and 5 Funderburg et al (2013, 575) make clear the limitations of their approach noting that: "we are prevented from concluding that incentives are more costly than reductions in basic system taxes to generate the same levels of new investment. The tax rates in this scenario are calculated as potential liability, distinct from the endogenous tax rates based on revenue. Costs will depend on the amount of exercised incentives that does not result in new investment. We can, however, conclude that incentives are much less effective than basic taxes at achieving a targeted level of new investment in this scenario."
Maryland, and compliment published work on the main Kansas economic development program (Jensen 2016) . Do these incentive programs generate jobs or do they incentivize companies that were already expecting to create jobs? This leads to the main hypothesis in this paper:
H1: Firms that receive incentives generate more jobs than a matched set of firm that did not receive incentives.
This main hypothesis is important for our understanding of incentive programs, but as outlined in the pre-registration document, numerous governments and economic development agencies have reformed their incentive programs to better assure taxpayers that economic development efforts are being monitored to assure compliance with the agreement between the investor and agency. Most notably, many states and municipalities now employ controls, such as clawback provisions as part of their incentive programs. 6 These clawback provisions are designed to monitor compliance with incentive agreements by canceling incentives with under-performing companies and often reclaiming incentives back from those failing firms.
States and municipalities can use these controls to mitigate the risks associated with these economic development policies, potentially reducing the risk that scarce economic development dollars are wasted (Sullivan and Green 1999) . Sullivan (2002) finds that municipalities that make the most extensive use of incentives are also the governments that employ the strongest controls. Sharp and Mullinex (2012) and Jensen, Malesky and Walsh (2015) find that form of government shapes the implementation of oversight and clawbacks at the local level. Peters (1993) of incentives across the Midwest, finding substantial differences in the application of clawbacks. Ledebur and Woodward (1990) provide advice on different forms of clawbacks that could be implemented by states.
Unfortunately, little research has focused on the effectiveness of clawbacks in policing the use of incentives. 7 As outlined in my pre-registration document, I will perform an additional subgroup analysis, dividing companies that were subject to clawbacks based on job creation thresholds from companies that were not subject to clawbacks. Does the average job creation of firms remaining in the program improve after removing those firms that are sanctioned for not meeting their requirements?
Data Description
To analyze the impact of incentive programs on job creation, I chose the two flagship incentive programs in the DC metro area. The Virginia Governor's Opportunity Fund (GOF) and the Maryland Economic Development Assistance Authority Fund (MEDAAF). Both programs are major state level incentive programs that provide discretionary incentives to companies.
For both programs, I obtained information on their incentive offerings from open record requests at relevant agencies in both states. I then matched this data with a larger database of essentially all firms in Virginia and Maryland to generating a control group of firms. I provide details on all three of these data sets. The program requires a local matching incentive by municipalities interested in applying for the grant. As described on the program website 8 :
Virginia Incentive Data
The Commonwealth's Opportunity Fund (COF), formerly known as the Governor's Opportunity Fund (GOF), is a discretionary incentive available to the Governor to secure a business location or expansion project for Virginia. Grants are awarded to localities on a local matching basis with the expectation that the grant will result in a favorable location decision for the Commonwealth.
The program provides grants to firms, in support of municipalities' applications for For compatibility with previous work, I will focus on incentives allocated from 2006-2012 (227 incentives). Each one of these incentives will be attributed to a single establishment using Dun and Bradstreet unique identifiers (DUNS numbers). Incentives will then be coded as either in good standing or subject to a clawback. 10 In the footnotes of excel file provided by the state 67 of the total incentives had additional documentation, including 57 incentives associated with a clawback. For example, Gateway's incentive contained the following note: "Original grant was for $1,500,000; $453,472 returned to date due to company not meeting thresholds." Any company that is identified for not meeting GOF thresholds is coded as clawed back.
Along with their annual reports Maryland's Department of Economic Development provided an excel worksheet of 113 investments that were associated with clawbacks.
The National Establishment Times Series Data (NETS)
Following Jensen (2016) I utilize the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) data to match Virginia and Maryland establishments that were provided incentives with similar firms in the state that were not provided incentives. The NETS database provides detailed information on essentially the full universe of firms in both states (described in Jensen 2016). I merge that Maryland MEDAAF and Virginia GOF data into the NETS data using Dun and Bradstreet numbers (DUNS).
Some firms have gone bankrupt, relocated, been acquired, or otherwise are no longer in the database. Thus, my analysis will only compare surviving firms (firms with DUNS numbers) in the analysis.
Pre-Registered Research Design
Across disciplines, researchers are confronting the potential for publication bias in academic research. Put simply, publication bias is a problem that certain types of studies are more likely than others to get published due to factors not directly relative to the quality of the research. Most commonly, publication bias refers to the research and peer-reviewer evaluations of studies based on the statistical significance of their results and not the quality of the data, novel theory, or appropriateness of the analysis. In the content of this paper, a research project that finds a strong positive or negative impact of incentives on job creation is more likely to be published than a study that shows no effect.
This can lead to two related problems. First, scholars can either decided to not submit papers with null results to journals, the so called "file drawer problem" (Franco et al 2014) .
Alternatively, researchers may run a number of alternative specifications until a statistically significant finding appears in their data analysis. Even experimental work is subject to these manipulations, where researchers selectively report some experimental results (Franco et al 2015) .
Second, publication bias could simply be a result of the review process where peer-reviewers are more likely to reject papers, ceteris paribus, that have null results and thus only strong negative or positive findings survive the peer review process (see Findley et al 2016) . In either case, the distribution of studies in academic journals is towards papers that achieve (often barely achieve) statistical significance (P<0.5).
To address this issue of publication bias-specifically p-hacking by researchers-scholars in fields including economics, medicine, political science, and psychology have adopted pre-registration as a means of providing greater transparency in the research process (Humphreys et al 2013; Miguel et al 2014; Olken 2015) . A pre-registration is simply a detailed plan by the researcher specifying the theory, data, and analysis prior to beginning a research project. Obviously, researchers encounter numerous challenges in the actual implementation of their projects, and are thus not legally or even ethically bound to follow their plans precisely. Nevertheless, researchers often feel compelled to document any changes because the original plan is publicly available.
For this project, I pre-registered by data, analysis and provided a mock table of the core results. This plan was archived at the Evidence in Governance and Politics design registry (http://egap.org/design-registrations) prior to obtaining any of the data. Thus, the analysis presented in Table 2 and Table 3 matches the pre-registered research design document prior to beginning this study.
My analysis utilizes coarsened exact matching (Iacus et al. 2012 ) to compare Maryland and Virginia incentive recipients with a matched set of control firms. I specifically match firms based on the natural log of employment in 2006, the three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, and a dummy variable if the firm was a subsidiary of a parent company. I registered the following hypothesis for the evaluation of the program:
Results
For all models, I use the natural log of 2012 employment at the level of the establishment as the dependent variable. I present the results of this study in Table 1 . The first model takes the naïve approach and simply examines the relationship between jobs in 2012 and whether or not a firm receives incentives using OLS. This doesn't control for the fact that the firms that applied for incentives were already larger than the non-incentivized firms, nor does it account for other factors that could affect employment. Model 2 includes a variable for the natural log of employment in 2006. only roughly 5% were provided economic development incentives through this program. The matching estimates suggest that job growth in the GOF firms would be similar even without the incentive.
In Models 4 and 5, I categorize firms that are in good standing or were subject to "clawbacks" by the states. These clawbacks are simply coded based on FOIA requests from both states indicating that the incentives were cancelled and/or part of the incentive was repaid for noncompliance with the incentive agreement. In Model 4, I estimate the impact of participating in the incentive program on employment for the disqualified firms. In Model 5, I perform coarsened exact matching that no longer includes the disqualified firms in the estimates.
11 http://vedpweb.yesvirginia.org/announcements#/NewExpanding In Table 2 , I present the same models, this time focusing on the Maryland MEDAAP incentive program. In Figure 2A and 2B, I present the kernel density before and after matching.
These results from In summary, both analyses point to the ineffectiveness of these incentive programs. Even for the Virginia Governor's Opportunity Fund, which also includes a matching local grant, I find no impact of these program on job creation. Both states have economic development programs that utilize clawbacks to assure that firms comply with incentive agreements. My results suggest that compliance with agreements, even if perfect, doesn't address the underlying redundancy issue with these programs. If incentives are given to companies that are likely to be expanding employment even without incentives, these programs are providing very few jobs. My analysis is the first pre-registered study of incentives, where the details for the project were pre-specified before purchasing the data. This limits researcher discretion in the analysis, and generally requires documentation of deviations from the pre-registered design. Note that there is nothing legally binding from this registration, only that the research process-from hypothesis generation, to measurement, to analysis-is made transparent prior to conducting the study.
Researchers can deviate from the registered design and can engage in induct data analysis, but the important thing is that pre-registration makes this transparent.
Pre-registering incentives can also mitigate potential bias in the self-evaluation of economic development incentive programs by economic development agencies, legislative audits, or other government actors. Many audits have become contentious: the Kansas Legislative Audit has been a back and forth between auditors and economic development agencies. Pre-registered analysis plans can allow all parties to agree on the proper way to evaluate incentives prior to data collection. This could lead to a more productive focus on how to best analyze economic policy, rather than defending or attacking the results of a program evaluation.
